

## **Poles of Attraction: How Many Poles Will Really Go West?**

(A rough draft)

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In October 2001 the PricewaterhouseCoopers caused a considerable consternation throughout the Europe by publishing a study according to which nearly six million of Poles, that is almost 40% of Poles of working age, and many other East Europeans would like to move to live and work in another European country within the next five years (see: Chart 1). The study was reliable, based on an omnibus survey of over 10,000 people in ten countries across Europe – Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, made between June and August 2001. The key findings suggest that the European Union is the preferred destination for 53% of Poles, with Germany in the first place (25%), later comes Italy (12%), the UK and France (10%), Spain (9%) and the Netherlands (8%), although more than one in five Poles cite Canada and the United States as countries where they would like to live and work.<sup>1</sup>

PricewaterhouseCoopers estimation was reliable also for other reason. Since 1945 population of many East European countries has been growing according to oscillatory pattern. Poland itself, who lost about six million of its citizens during the Second World War, was experiencing after the war several high demographic “waves”, followed by similar number of smaller ones. Their results are visible even today. The cohort of teenagers entering secondary schools was so small in 1999 (actually, nearly 25% smaller than year before), that the government was able to introduce a new, wider system of national education, engaging pupils in the process of education for one year longer than previously. In the same time, other, relatively huge cohort of young people started to leave schools and universities, producing high unemployment in the country and contributing the growing wave of Polish emigrants at the end of 90.

High unemployment and enduring economic stagnancy are good reason to go abroad. In 2002 unemployment rate reached in Poland 21,2%, but even 42,7% in the group 15-24 years old.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to find job, especially in the province, far from the biggest cities, even if the national economy is slowly recovering, reaching up to 2,5% GDP growth in 2003, as it is supposed by the government.

How many Poles, in fact, will go West, how many are supposed to stay, and for how long?

### **Poles of attraction**

There are several objective factors that are, and continually will be, attracting citizens of the former communist countries to go West. Ordinary Polish employee earns in his country nearly three times less than his German counterpart (respectively, \$10.900 to \$25,700), but when he apprise his earnings not in the term of their purchasing power at the home market, but rather exchanging them in a bank before he goes abroad for holidays, the difference

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<sup>1</sup> Mark Ambler (ed.), *Managing mobility matters – a European perspective*, [Prague], PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001, p. 17. Also at <http://www.pwcglobal.com> (accessed: January 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Raport z wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2002, Warszawa, GUS, 2003, Chapter 5. Aktywność ekonomiczna ludności, pp. 61-62. Also at <http://www.stat.gov.pl> (accessed: July 2003).

becomes nearly twice much unpleasant.<sup>3</sup> What makes Western salaries so attractive to an Eastern European are not only present exchange rates, but also some real perspectives for the future. Fertility rates across Europe are now so low that, according the UN predictions, the population of the 27 future members of the EU will fall by 6% till 2050, from 482m to 454m, and become much, much elder. By 2050 the number of Italians may have fallen from 57.5m to around 45m, and of Spaniard from 40m to 37m. Germany, who have now around 80m, would count mere 25m inhabitants by the end of this century, according to the Deutsche Bank researchers, who are also convinced that “even assuming (no doubt unrealistically high) annual immigration of 250,000, the population of Germany would decline to about 50 m by 2100”.<sup>4</sup>

There are currently 35 people of pensionable age for every 100 people of working age in Europe. By 2050, if present demographic trends will not change, there will be 75 pensioners for every 100 workers; in Spain and Italy the ratio of pensioners to workers is projected to be one-to-one. Deutsche Bank calculates that average earners in Germany are already paying around 29% of their wages into the state pension pot, while in Italy close to 33%.<sup>5</sup> Even if European countries decide to transform radically their pension systems, strong demand for skilled and unskilled workers is supposed to grow continually among all of them.

Many authors argue that only a radical change of family and immigration policy would sustain prosperity of the European economies in the future.<sup>6</sup> Such a tendency is already well visible in the United States that has been a country of immigration since it came into being. The US population is expected to rise to just under 400 million by 2050.<sup>7</sup> In Canada, officially “multicultural” since years, ethnic and cultural diversity is perceived as a driving force of social and economic development. The 300,000 immigrations targeted each year by the Canadian government focus primarily on highly skilled employees. The most active naturalisation country among the EU member states are the Netherlands, which have no specific quotas or selection by particular professions, but pursue an active integration policy with integration courses set out to foster the new immigrants’ language skills and identity.

Other European countries are still loosing their labor force, and probably will lose it in the nearest future even much faster (see: Chart 2). To revert this process effectively, or at least slow it down, some special interventions are required form the part of the governments. The initial requirement is to raise the value ascribed to children and family in industrial society. Another necessity is a more liberal immigration policy. Such a policy would have many political opponents, but ought to be concentrated on the crucial issue, that is regulation of

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<sup>3</sup> Eastern European currencies are much underestimated. Their official exchange rates are even 40% lower than their purchasing power measured in relations to the ordinary good available on the local market. Cf. Bold in part, *The Economist*, Oct 25th, 2001.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Dieter Bräuninger et al., *The demographic challenge*, in Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt Voice. Demography Special, September 6, 2002, p. 11, at <http://www.dbresearch.de> (accessed: July 12003). See also: *Europe's population implosion*, *The Economist* Jul 17th, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dieter Bräuninger et al., *The demographic challenge*, op. cit.; K. McMorrow and W. Roeger, *The Economic Consequences of Ageing Populations (a Comparison of the EU, US and Japan)*, 1999; T. Dang et al., *Fiscal Implications of Ageing: Projections of Age-Related Spending*, 2001; R. Brooks, *What Will Happen to Financial Markets when the Baby Boomers Retire?*, 2000; M. Lührmann, *The Role of Demographic Change in Explaining International Capital Flows*, 2002; R. Holzmann, R.: *Can Investment in Emerging Markets Help to Solve the Ageing Problem?*, 2000; A. Börsch-Supan, *Population Ageing, Savings Behaviour and Capital Markets*, 2001, D. Turner et al., *The Macroeconomic Implications of Ageing in a Global Context*, OECD Working Paper No. 193, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. M. Karczmar, *Rise in anti-immigration sentiments in the United States*, in Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt Voice, July 30, 2002.

immigration in the labour market, which has to be more attractive to skilled workers. This policy includes also better integration of foreigners, and in this issue politicians must play an active part in preparing the ground for such a integration in wide public debate. "Everyone must realize, as German experts argue, that without immigration the ageing and declining populations of the industrial countries will suffer disastrous consequences of the demographic challenge".<sup>8</sup>

### **How much attracted**

In the first half of 2001, according to the statistics of the Polish Ministry of Work and Social Policy, 227.000 Poles left the country and work abroad. It was nearly as much as in the entire previous year, when just 287.000 emigrated. Absolute majority of 2001 emigrants went to Germany (220.800), and only 5.100 to Spain, 1.000 to France, mere 200 to the Great Britain, and 100 to Ireland and Switzerland. According to the same source there were 297.070 Poles employed abroad in 2001, of which 266.500 were undertaking a seasonal, short-term job, mostly in agriculture (266,500), and mostly in Germany (284.000).<sup>9</sup>

The data given above do not say how many Poles really left the country. Many emigrant-workers indicated in this statistics have been "counted" twice or more times, because many of them took the same short-term job for several times, frequently in the same place, visiting their homeland in meantime. In the other hand, many Poles went to Germany and the other EU countries as tourists and took some job illegally. Some experts are convinced that middle time of such an illegal employment of Poles in Germany dwells about two months.<sup>10</sup> Taking this in account, total number of legal and illegal Polish workers in Germany would be much smaller than it is suggested by official statistics. Marek Okólski is convinced that there are about 35.000 illegal Polish workers coming each year to Germany, and not just 200.000, as some sources claim (cf. Table 3). According to Okólski, there is no realistic data on immigration, even EUROSTAT can not give them, and for this reason all estimations on the future East European immigration to the EU countries represent in certain sense a sort of political prophecy.<sup>11</sup>

It is difficult to disagree with Okólski, even if there is no decisive prove that he is right. Official figures produced by Polish Central Statistical Office at the end of the year indicate that only 23.368 Poles left the country in 2001.<sup>12</sup> Also figures given by the National Census made in 2002 give similar numbers. There were 21.500 emigrants in 1999, 27.000 in 2000, and 23,300 in 2001. In the whole period 1990-2001 total number of Polish emigrants would be 275.314 person.<sup>13</sup>

Teresa Iglicka gives similar numbers (cf. Chart 3). She argues that total number of persons who decided to leave the country after the collapse of communist regime in Poland in 1989 was by 40% smaller than in the pervious period 1985-1989, when it was reaching 29.800 a

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Dieter Bräuninger et al., *The demographic challenge*, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> Adam Maciejewski, Piotr Apanowicz, Szymon Araszkievicz, *Dużo zbieraczy, mało informatyków*, Rzeczpospolita, No. 208, September 6th, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Marek Okólski, *O rzeczową argumentację w kwestii swobodnego przepływu pracowników*, in Andrzej Stępiak (ed.), *Swobodny przepływ pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa, UKIE, 2001, pp. 19-40, at p. 27.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 40, and the references.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *International migration of population for permanent residence by sex and educational level of migrants* (Table 22), in *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2002*, Warszawa, GUS, 2003, at <http://www.stat.gov.pl> (accessed: July 1st 2003).

<sup>13</sup> *Ludność, ruch naturalny i migracyjny w latach 1946-2001*, Warszawa, GUS, 2002, at <http://www.stat.gov.pl/> (accessed: July 1st, 2003).

year, and by 19% smaller than in the period 1980-1984 when annual middle was about mere 24.400.<sup>14</sup> This quite shocking evidence has much to do with the cultural and historical context. Strangely, far bigger cohort of Poles left the country in the 80s, when the borders were strictly closed by the communist regime, but also by the Western countries, for it was not only difficult to get a visa in this time, but also the passport, kept by the police in this time, than in the 90s, when the free tourist movement was reestablished with nearly all European countries and many Poles started travel intensively.

There are also social differences between the 80s and 90s migrations. The first tide was also much more harmful than the second one. In the communist period it was much easier to leave the country, for the reason of many administrative obstacles, to the better educated and comparatively well-situated persons, usually living from the big cities, than for the others. This is way emigration that happened in the 80s would be called a real of brain-drain. Many of those who left the country, made it for good, knowing that the second attempt to go abroad would be not so successful.<sup>15</sup>

Instead, in the 90s, when so many Polish “tourists” (migrant workers with tourists visas) took some illegal work in the EU countries or in America, large part of this group were persons coming from the poorest regions of the country. Their “emigration” was usually temporal. They used to cross the border every three months to make their visas valid. Working in the country of destination they remain by no mean competitive to the local workers. Iglicka brings in evidence growing percentage of low educated persons among Polish emigrants in the period 1988-1999, from about 40% to about 80%, when in the same time emigration of the best educated radically diminishes, from about 10% in 1988 to just 2-4% in 1999.<sup>16</sup> About 600 thousand Poles who left the homeland in the 90s returned later to the country. Number of Polish women who decided to marry a citizen of western European country was in the 90s by 70% smaller than in the 80s.<sup>17</sup> This tendency says much about transformation of the hopes and other values experienced in daily life by the society slowly recovering from hopeless communist utopia.

For the large majority of Polish migrants destination country was Germany (cf. Chart 4). It was so in any period of time. Polish companies active in Germany can legally employ there up to 22.000 Polish workers, but since years this limit was never executed fully for different reasons, mostly administrative ones. Also the quotas of legal employment of Poles under bilateral employment agreements signed with Germany and France were never fulfilled. About 252 thousands of Poles were working, mostly as seasonal workers, in France in the period 1992-1999, and about 1.2 million in Germany (cf. Table 1).<sup>18</sup> In both this cases existence of the “migration networks” – historical social relations between the places and people in the native country and the country of destination – is evident.

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<sup>14</sup> Teresa Iglicka, *Migracje zagraniczne Polaków w drugiej połowie XX wieku*, in: Andrzej Stepniak (ed.), *Swobodny przepływ pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: UKIE, 2001, pp. 41-50.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 27.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 47.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 44.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Andrzej Stepniak (ed.), *Enlargement of the European Union to the East. Consequences for prosperity and employment in Europe* (Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 2000), p. 88. Based on a paper prepared for the Office of the Committee for European Integration by Prof. Antoni Rajkiewicz.

## **What will happen in the future?**

It is quite possible that the free movement of persons in the enlarged Europe will bring similar effects to the dynamics of migration, like this what happened in Poland after 1989.

The emigration from Poland will not grow dramatically in the nearest future. In the future there will be no strong demographic factor to emigrate from Poland. The young workforce in Poland (15-44 years of age) will be diminished by about 570.000 before the year 2020.

Estimations on the migration from the candidate countries under the condition of the free movement of persons to the UE differ according to different presupposition regarding social, political and economic situation on the continent (cf. Table 2, 3, 4). The figures vary from 860 thousand<sup>19</sup> to 4.2 million<sup>20</sup> (cf. Table 4).

Leszek Zienkowski gives an interesting estimation on emigration from Poland to the UE countries according to the three possible scenarios related to a slow, constant, or rapid economic growth in Poland.<sup>21</sup> Economic stagnancy would produce, according to him, up to 1.5 million of Polish emigrants, when instead a constant GDP growth would encourage only 711.000 of Poles to go abroad. A less probable option, rapid economic growth, would give mere 380.000 emigrants in total (cf. Table 2).

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<sup>19</sup> Herbert Brücker and Tito Boeri, *The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU Member States*, Commissioned by the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission, Berlin and Milano, European Integration Consortium, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> Hans-Werner Sinn et al., *EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration. Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmarktes*, München: Ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 2, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> Leszek Zienkowski, *Ekonomiczne aspekty swobodnego przepływu pracowników w rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej*, in: Andrzej Stepniak, *Swobodny przepływ pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2001, pp. 99-126, at p. 117.

## **Appendix 1: Polish legal adjustments before entering the EU**

The Labour Code of June 26th, 1974, constitutes basic Polish legislation regulating employment relationships. An extensive revision of 1996 has basically approximated the Polish law with the *acquis communautaire* in this respect, however, full harmonisation required further amendments.

The Polish law has been harmonised with Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, through an amendment to the Act of May 23rd, 1991, on trade unions; with Council Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer's obligation to inform employees on the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship, through an amendment to the Labour Code; with Council Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work, through an amendment to the Labour Code and other relevant acts; and with Council Directive 93/104/EEC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, through an amendment to the Labour Code.

Polish legislation was also aligned with Council Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies by December 31st, 2002, through an amendment to the Act of 28 December 1989 on special conditions for the termination of employment due to reasons relating to employer and the Act of 14 December 1994 on employment and combating of unemployment.


By 31 December 2002, Poland has to align its legislation with: Council Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work, through an amendment to the Labour Code and adoption of a regulation on the scope and conditions of short-term and occasional work in households and family businesses; with Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the posting of workers, through the adoption of a regulation on the conditions of employment of posted workers and through the lifting of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of May 3rd, 1989, on the principles of compensation and other benefits for employees posted abroad (export of construction works and related services); the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of December 27th, 1974, on certain rights and duties of employees posted abroad (export of construction works and related services); with Council Directive 91/383/EEC supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship, through an amendment to the Labour Code and the Act on employment and combating of unemployment; with Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of European Works Councils or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees, through the adoption of an act on European Works Councils.

Polish legislation is in full compliance with Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer.

## Appendix 2. Charts and Tables


**Chart 1. Would you like to move to live and work in another European country in the next five years?**

Source: Mark Ambler (ed.), *Managing mobility matters – a European perspective*, Prague: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001, p. 17.




**Chart 2. Labour force to population ratio.**

Source: From Dieter Bräuninger et al., *The demographic challenge*, in Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt Voice. Demography Special, September 6, 2002, p. 43.




**Chart 3. Middle annual migrations calculated in five year periods from/to Poland, 1950-1999, in thousands.**



Source: Teresa Iglicka, *Migracje zagraniczne Polaków w drugiej połowie XX wieku*, in: Andrzej Stepniak (ed.), *Swobodny przepływ pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: UKIE, 2001, pp. 41-50, at p. 42.

**Chart 4. Migration form Poland to other countries, 1989-2002, in %.**

Source: Raport z wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2002, Warszawa: GUS, 2003, Chapter 3: *Migracje ludności*, p. 47, at <http://www.stat.gov.pl> (accessed July 2003).





**Table 1. Legal employment of Poles abroad under signed bilateral employment agreements.**

Country	Nature of agreement	Number of persons employed
France	Agreement on exchanges for vocational training purposes, 1990	101 in 1999*
	Agreement on the employment of Polish seasonal workers in France, 1992	18.798 in the period 1992-1998 2.721 in 1999
	Agreement on the secondment of workers of Polish enterprises for the purpose of realising works contacts, 1990	c. 230.000 in the period 1991-1999
Germany	Agreement on the employment of <i>Gastarbeiter</i>	6.697 in the period 1991-1999*
	Agreement on mediation in the employment for a limited period of Polish workers, 1999 (earlier mediation was based on a 1990 declaration)	
	- as seasonal workers	c. 1.138.000 in the period 1991-1999
	- in border areas	c. 16.150 in the period 1991-1998

\* Poland did not fill the quota opened by France

\*\* Poland did not fill the quota opened by Germany

Source: Andrzej Stepniak (ed.), *Enlargement of the European Union to the East. Consequences for prosperity and employment in Europe* (Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 2000), p. 88. Based on a paper prepared for the Office of the Committee for European Integration by Prof. Antoni Rajkiewicz.

**Table 2. Estimated emigration from Poland to the UE according to the three possible scenarios, in thousands.**

	Scenario A	Scenario B	Scenario C
	GDP growth in Poland		
	Slow	Constant	Quick
Germany	410	276	195
France	134	77	43
Austria	123	61	23
Belgium	106	48	14
Netherlands	104	48	15
Sweden	102	46	12
Italy	93	52	27
Great Britain	91	50	25
Finland	90	38	6
Denmark	85	42	16
Spain	45	14	0
Ireland	44	5	0
Luxembourg	34	15	4
Greece	12	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0
Total	1472	711	380

Source: Leszek Zienkowski, *Ekonomiczne aspekty swobodnego przeplywu pracowników w rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej*, in: Andrzej Stepniak, *Swobodny przeplyw pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2001, pp. 99-126, at p. 117.

**Table 3. Estimated emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU.**

Attention: Figures do not correspond one to another due to differences in time span and geographical coverage.

Source	Estimated migrants	From	Method applied in this estimation
Loyard et al. 1992	130.000 a year to all the Western countries.	Poland, Czech Rep., Hungary, Slovakia, and other Eastern European countries	3% of the population of Eastern European countries emigrated to the Northern Europe in 1950-1970. Loyard takes this fact as a point of reference in his evaluation.
Brueker/Franzmeyer 1997	(1) 340.000-680.000 a year to the EU, or (2) 590.000-1.800.000 a year, to the EU	(1) Poland, Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia (2) all applying countries	'Gravitational model', respecting different economical factors, esp. differences in the income level.
Fassmann/Hintermann 1997	721.000 as a real migration potential, 320.000 to Germany, 150.000 to Austria	Czech, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary	Gallup Institute inquiry made in these four countries.
Aintila 1998	c. 13.000 a year to Finland	Baltic countries and Poland	Evaluations based on Lundberg's work.
Birner/Huber/Winkler 1998	(1) 24.100 (2) 21.700 regional migration to Austria in the first year of liberalisation	Czech Rep., Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary	(1) if the first year of liberalization will be 2004 (2) in the first year of liberalization will be 2010 Method based on Walterskirchen-Dietz research applied to the border regions of Austria
Hofer 1998	25.000-40.000 to Austria, each year	Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia	Recounting of the results of Brueker/Franzmeyer 1997
Lundborg et al. 1997 Lundborg 1998	628.000-1.885.000 workers (including families) to EU within 15 years; 126.000 each year; 20.000-30.000 to Sweden only	Baltic countries and Poland	As in Loyard 1992
Sujanova/Sujan 1997 (also Huber/Pichelmann 1998, Hofer 1998)	39.000 to the EU in the years 2005-2010	only Czech Rep.	Econometric model
Huber/Pichelmann 1998	140.000-200.000 to the EU	Central and East European countries	Based on Sujanova/Sujan 1997 estimation
Sik 1998 (also Huber 1999, Salt 1999)	Migration potential in the border regions	Hungary	Panel research
Walterskirchen/Dietz 1998	(1) 42.000 (2) 31.600 to Austria (workers and oscillatory movement) 150.000-200.000 a year in the following 5 years 150.000 a year in longer period	Czech Rep., Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary	As in Brueker/Franzmeyer 1997: (1) if the free movement will be introduced in 2005 (2) and if it will be introduced in 2015.
Wallace/IOM 1998	No estimations; explained reasons of migration and indicated the most preferred countries of destination.	Poland, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, old Jugolavia, Ukraine, Bielorrussia	Inquiry made in a representative group of c. 1000 person in every of their countries.
Bauer/Zimmermann 1999	c. 3.000.000 within next 10-15 years; 200.000 each year the EU	Czech Rep., Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Rumania, Bulgaria	Two scenarios: with transition periods and without them.

Fertig 1999 (also Huber 1999)	(1) 31.000-38.000 to Germany each year within next 20 years	(1) from the countries received in the first round: Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Hungary	It is enlargement of the Halton's (1995) model based on data given by the German Migration Office. Presupposes the middle GDP growth 2 points greater in the Central and Eastern European countries than in Western Europe.
	(2) 33.000-39.000 each year	(2) from the countries received in the second round: Bulgaria, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia	
Salt et al. 1999	max. 41.000 to the EU each year	Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Hungary	Projection based on the past immigration indicators of several Western countries in 1985-1995
Orłowski/Zienkowski 1999	390.000-1.000.000 to the EU; 195.000-410.000 to Germany; 23.000-123.000 to Austria	Poland only	'Gravitational' model. The results depends much on presupposed economic factors.

Source: Leszek Zienkowski, 'Ekonomiczne aspekty swobodnego przeplywu pracowników w rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej', in Andrzej Stepniak, *Swobodny przeplyw pracowników w kontekście wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej* (Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2001), pp. 99-126, at pp. 122-123.

For the bibliographical references to the authors quoted above see W. Quaisser, M. Hartmann, E. Hoenekopp, M. Brandmeier, *Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union: Konsequenz für Wohlstand und Beschäftigung in Europa*, Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000, p. 117.

**Table 4. Estimated migration to the EU countries from the candidate countries under the condition of the free movement of persons.**

	CC8* migrants		CC10 migrants	
	Stock	Flow/year over first 10 years	Stock	Flow/year over first 10 years
Brücker/Boeri 2000 (only workers)	860,000 (after 10 years)	70,000 declining to 30,000	1.4 million (after 10 years)	120,000 declining to 50,000
Brücker/Boeri 2000 (all migrants)	1.8 million (after 10 y.)	200,000 declining to 85,000	2.9 million (after 10 years)	335,000 declining to 145,000
Sinn et al. 2001#	2.7 million (after 15 years)	240,000 declining to 125,000	4.2 million (after 15 years)	380,000 declining to 200,000
Walterskirehen/Dietz 1998†		160,000 declining to 110,000		
Bauer/Zimmermann 1999‡	2.5 million (after 15 years)			200,000
Fassmann/Hintermann 1997‡	720,000 long-term migration			
Hille/Straubhaar 2000				270.000 to 790.000
Salt et al. 1999††	2.25 million (3% of population) (after 15 years)	140.000		

Attention: Some figures are extrapolations due to differences in time span and geographical coverage.

Source: European Commission, *The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement*, Information Note: 6 March 2001, p. 34.

\* CC8 includes all candidate countries aspiring to accede in 2003: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

# Excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia and Baltic States. For the sake of comparability, figures are extrapolated to the whole EU from research results for Germany, assuming the present distribution of migrants among the EU15 remains the same.


† For the sake of comparability, figures are extrapolated to the whole EU from research results for Austria, assuming the present distribution of migrants among the EU15 remains the same.

‡ Excluding Slovakia and Baltic States.

†† Excluding Baltic States.

### Chart 5. Unemployment rate in selected countries, 1990-2001, %

Source: OECD. Cf. Halina Binczak, "Sam rynek pracy nie wystarczy", Rzeczpospolita, 23rd March, 2002.



### Table 5. Unemployment growth in the EE countries, 1991-1999, %

Source: Rzeczpospolita, 1st February 2000; Polish Central Statistical Office; EBRD 1999; ECE 1999; Economic situation and outlook for Poland, 1st-3rd quarter 1999, IBnGR, Gdansk 1999. Cf. Andrzej Stępnik (ed.), Enlargement of the European Union to the East, Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 2000, p. 92.

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Rep.	4,1	2,6	3,5	3,2	2,9	3,5	5,2	7,5	9,4
Estonia	-	-	6,5	7,6	9,7	10,0	9,7	9,6	-
Lithuania	0,3	1,3	4,4	3,8	6,2	7,0	5,9	6,4	-
Latvia	0,6	39	87	16,7	18,1	194	14,8	13,8	-
Poland	11,6	13,6	16,4	16,0	14,9	11,5	10,2	10,4	13,0
Slovenia	7,3	8,3	9,1	9,0	7,4	7,3	74	7,9	-
Hungary	7,4	12,3	12,1	10,4	10,4	10,5	10,4	9,1	9,4

### Table 6. Registered unemployment rate in Poland, 1990-2002, in %

Ratio of unemployed persons to the economically active civil population.


Source: Polish Official Statistics at <http://www.stat.gov.pl> (accessed: July 2003).

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1990	0,3	0,8	1,5	1,9	2,4	3,1	3,8	4,5	5	5,5	5,9	6,5
1991	6,6	6,8	7,1	7,3	7,7	8,4	9,4	9,8	10,5	10,8	11,1	12,2
1992	12,1	12,4	12,1	12,2	12,3	12,6	13,1	13,4	13,6	13,5	13,5	14,3
1993	14,2	14,4	14,4	14,4	14,3	14,8	15,4	15,4	15,4	15,3	15,5	16,4
1994	16,7	16,8	16,7	16,4	16,2	16,6	16,9	16,8	16,5	16,2	16,1	16
1995	16,1	15,9	15,5	15,2	14,8	15,2	15,3	15,2	15	14,7	14,7	14,9
1996	15,4	15,5	15,4	15,1	14,7	14,3	14,1	13,8	13,5	13,2	13,3	13,2
1997	13,1	13	12,6	12,1	11,7	11,6	11,3	11,0	10,6	10,3	10,3	10,3
1998	10,7	10,6	10,4	10,0	9,7	9,6	9,6	9,5	9,6	9,7	9,9	10,4
1999	11,4	11,9	12,0	11,8	11,6	11,6	11,8	11,9	12,1	12,2	12,5	13,1
2000	13,7	14,0	14,0	13,8	13,6	13,6	13,8	13,9	14,0	14,1	14,5	15,1
2001	15,7	15,9	16,1	16,0	15,9	15,9	16,0	16,2	16,3	16,4	16,8	17,4
2002*	18,1	18,2	18,2	17,9	17,3	17,4	17,5	17,5	17,6	17,5	17,8	18,1
2003	18,7	18,8	18,7	18,4	17,9	17,8						
* Data revised												
Data not revised												

### Chart 6. Average monthly unemployment benefit, 1999, in \$.

\* estimated (Bulgaria).

Source: Business Central Europe, December 2000/January 2001.



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